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Abstract—This paper presents a privacy-preserving framework
for the protection of sensitive positions in real time trajectories.
We assume a scenario in which the sensitivity of user’s positions
is space-varying, and so depends on the spatial context, while
the user’s movement is conﬁned to road networks and places.
Typical users are the non-anonymous members of a geo-social
network who agree to share their exact position whenever such
position does not fall within a sensitive place, e.g. a hospital.
Suspending location sharing while the user is inside a sensitive
place is not an appropriate solution because the user’s stopovers
can be easily inferred from the user’s trace. In this paper we
present an extension of the semantic location cloaking model [1]
originally developed for the cloaking of non-correlated positions
in an unconstrained space. We investigate different algorithms
for the generation of cloaked regions over the graph representing
the urban setting. We also integrate methods to prevent velocity-
based linkage attacks. Finally we evaluate experimentally the
algorithms using a real data set.
I. INTRODUCTION
Location sharing is an increasingly popular location-based
information service (LBS), available for example in geo-
social networking applications, such as Google Latitude and
Glympse, to enable users equipped with a location-aware
client to share their position with friends. Position is typically
computed by a third party, the network location provider (e.g.
Skyhook Wireless), based on the contextual information sent
by the client, e.g. the wiﬁ networks in the vicinity. In dense
urban areas, individuals can be tracked both in indoor and
outdoor spaces with a spatial accuracy of a few tens of meters.
Moreover, following common practices, the requesters of the
location service are not anonymous.
In this paper we focus on the issue of protecting the users
of a location sharing application, located in an urban setting,
against the risk of semantic location identiﬁcation [1]. The
problem is to prevent the disclosure of users’ positions to
untrusted LBS providers and friends, when users stop in
some sensitive semantic location (or place) along the way. A
sensitive place is a bounded place within which any position is
considered as sensitive information, e.g. a hospital. Following
the advances in positioning technology, identifying the places
in which users stay is becoming more and more easy [2].
An example of urban setting is shown in Figure 1. The
map shows a number of places in Milan1: the premises of the
1The map is drawn from http://www.openstreetmap.org
Fig. 1. Urban setting including a hospital (H) and a university campus (U).
Policlinico hospital, the University of Milan, a few religious
buildings, various private buildings, and the road network.
Assume that the user Bob connects to the location sharing
service through a mobile device, e.g. a smartphone, requesting
the location service to a trusted network location provider. Bob
is driving his car when in the proximity of the Policlinico
hospital, Bob stops in a parking area and steps onto the
hospital premises where he remains for a few hours for a
medical visit, before again taking the car to reach his friends
in a pub in downtown. During this time, Bob’s position is
continuously reported to the LBS provider as well as his
friends, therefore the route and the places in which Bob stops
as well as the time spent in each of those places are made
known to the untrusted parties (i.e. the adversary), including
the hospital that Bob considers a sensitive place. Of course,
Bob could decide to disconnect himself from the location
sharing service. However that would prevent Bob from being
in touch with his friends, unless suspending and then resuming
the service which would create considerable burden to Bob.
To overcome this problem, policy-based solutions specify-
ing privacy rules such as “do not disclose the position if I am
nearby a hospital” are not really helpful, because the adversary
could infer the destination from the analysis of the user’s
trace. Also the approaches based on the mix-zone and location
anonimyzation paradigms, such as [3], [4] are not appropriate,
because of the assumption that users are not anonymous.
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Fig. 2. (a) Graph-based representation of the urban setting with two places, Hospital and University; (b) a naive CR (in bold inside the circle) ; (c) the CR
(in bold inside the circle) comprising the two places.
A more robust approach is semantic location cloaking
[1], [5]. Relevant features of this solution are: a) privacy
can be personalized, i.e. a privacy proﬁle speciﬁes sensitive
place types and the desired degree of privacy for each of
those types; b) location cloaking algorithms generate cloaked
regions (CRs) which cover sensitive places while satisfying
the preferences in the privacy proﬁle independently of the
user’s actual position. These algorithms, which can be deﬁned
as location oblivious, prevent any inference on the possible
correlation between the users’ position and the CR; c) ﬁnally
the position transformation operation matches users’ position
against the set of CRs. If such a position falls into one of
those CRs then that CR becomes the location which is shared,
otherwise the actual position is disclosed.
Unfortunately, semantic location cloaking methods have
been designed to work only in unconstrained spaces in which
users can move without restrictions, while in an urban set-
ting the movement is conﬁned to road networks (such as
local streets, railways, highways) and places. This calls for
a different model of CR grounded on the urban topology.
Such scenario also brings to the forefront another major
requirement. In particular a CR should not only blur the actual
position but also possible stopovers in sensitive places.
As an example, Figure 2.(a) shows the graph-based repre-
sentation of (a small portion of) the previous urban setting. The
nodes of the graph represent places (black rectangles) and road
junctions (blue circles), while the edges represent two-ways
road segments. This ﬁgure shows two places, an hospital (H)
and a university (U). For example, a CR blurring the hospital
could include, besides the hospital, a number of road segments
in proximity (in bold in Figure 2.(b)). Note, however, that
if the user remains in this CR for a sufﬁciently long time,
for example longer than the time needed for traversing all
the roads, it is very likely that the user stops at the hospital
because there is no alternative place in the CR in which the
user can reasonably spend much time. The user’s stopover is
thus disclosed.
To forestall this privacy breach an approach is to deﬁne CRs
which contain one or more non-sensitive places. For example
the CR in Figure 2.(c) contains also the university which is a
highly frequented place. An individual located in the CR can
be either in U or in H, or simply driving along the roads. In any
case, should the user stop at some place, such place would be
uncertain. The higher the popularity of the non-sensitive places
in the CR, the lower the chances of linking the user with a
sensitive place. This calls for solutions which use background
knowledge on places to generate appropriate CRs.
Another requirement to address regards the aforementioned
operation of position transformation, i.e. the operation match-
ing the actual user’s position against the set of CRs. Whenever
the user’s position is frequently updated, an adversary can
use the information on the speed of the user to prune the
CR and thus more precisely localize the user inside the CR.
This inference is called velocity-based linkage attack [6]. Since
this kind of privacy breach can compromise the effectiveness
of the cloaking strategy, countermeasures tailored on the
urban setting are to be integrated into the privacy protection
framework. In this paper we address all these requirements.
In summary, the major contributions of this paper are:
• We present a comprehensive approach to the problem of
safeguarding sensitive positions in an urban setting. The
approach extends the semantic location cloaking model
and integrates countermeasures against the velocity-based
linkage attack.
• We specify two different cloaking techniques for the
ofﬂine generation of CRs (static location cloaking).
These techniques generate non-overlapping and overlap-
ping CRs, respectively. This is a major novelty because
existing algorithms are only capable of generating non-
overlapping CRs. We also adapt these algorithms to the
case in which CRs are generated at run-time (dynamic
cloaking).
• We evaluate those methods bases on a real data set
(OpenStreetMap dataset). We show that the generation
of overlapping CRs is signiﬁcantly more efﬁcient and
provides more accurate CRs than the generation of non-
overlapping CRs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section overviews related work. Section III develops the
problem formulation, formally deﬁning the privacy require-
ments. Algorithms are provided in Section IV, after which we
detail an experimental evaluation of our proposal in Section
V. Finally, Section VI concludes and presents our agenda for
the future work.
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II. RELATED WORK
This work relates to two main streams of research, concern-
ing the modeling of semantic trajectories and location privacy,
respectively.
a) Semantic trajectories: a semantic trajectory is an
annotated representation of the trace of a moving object.
Although it is not rigorously deﬁned, this notion is used
in a variety of applications, such as recommender systems
suggesting popular places and tours [2], navigation services
in indoor settings [7], compression of raw trajectories [8].
A conceptual data model for the representation of semantic
trajectories has been deﬁned by Spaccapietra et al. [9]. In
such a model, a semantic trajectory is a sequence of stops and
moves where a stop can represent a place, e.g. home, while a
move represents the path, e.g. the sequence of road segments,
between two consecutive places. The overall purpose is to
provide a way for representing the behavior of moving objects.
In this view, blurring sensitive places paves the way to the
deﬁnition of privacy-preserving semantic trajectories.
b) Location privacy: In recent work, Chow & Mokbel
[10] survey trajectory privacy techniques in the context of
continuous LBS (as opposed to snapshot LBS), such as [11],
[12], and trajectory data publishing, such as [13], [14]. Tacit
assumption is that the privacy goal is to safeguard identity
privacy [15], because position can act as quasi-identiﬁer
[16] and thus identity privacy is at stake if users are to be
anonymous. In reality, position information can also play, in
alternative or in addition to the role of quasi-identiﬁer, the
role of sensitive attribute. Moreover, the position can have
the granularity of place (instead of coordinated point) and be
deﬁned in a symbolic way. A number of approaches adopt this
viewpoint. For example, Bamba et al. present PrivacyGrid, a
system that supplements location k-anonymity with location
l-diversity [17]. In this approach, a cloaked region is a region
containing k mobile users and l places (here called static
objects, e.g. churches and clinics). There is no distinction
between sensitive and non-sensitive places. A similar notion
of location l-diversity has been used with linear objects for
anonymizing the positions of LBS users driving along a
road network [18]. In this case, the exact user position is
replaced by a set of segments. The number of segments in the
cloaked region deﬁnes the degree of diversity. In the previous
approaches, the cloaked region (or the set of segments) is l-
occurrence diverse but not l-type diverse. For example, the l
places may all be of the same type (e.g. l hospitals). Xue et
al. [19] deﬁned location-diversity as the number of different
types of places.
In all these solutions, the degree of diversity is measured by
counting the number of occurrences or types inside the cloaked
region. The fact that places can be differently frequented and
so have a different degree of popularity, is not taken into
account. An approach that overcomes this limitation while
providing guarantees of location diversity in a space of non-
uniformly distributed positions in which there are sensitive
and non-sensitive places is Probe [5]. All these approaches,
however, target snapshots LBS. A different solution which
targets the protection of both sensitive positions and identity
privacy is presented by Monreale et al. [20], but in a different
application context, i.e. trajectory data publishing. We are
not aware, instead, of techniques enabling the protection of
sensitive positions in continuous LBS under road network
constraints, which is the focus of this paper.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Background knowledge model and deﬁnitions
Let us denote with PT and P the set of place types (e.g.
hospital, mall) and places (i.e. Policlinico, Carrefour) in a bi-
dimensional coordinate space. We introduce the concept of
annotated city network to model the background knowledge
on the urban setting.
Deﬁnition 1 (Annotated city network): An annotated city
network is a connected and undirected weighted graph
G=(V,E, pop, pt, tt) where:
i) V = VP
⋃
Vj is the set of vertices with v ∈ VP
representing a place and v ∈ Vj a road junction2
ii) E ⊆ V × V is the non-empty set of edges where edge
(u, v) ∈ E denotes a road segment connecting two road
junctions or, alternatively, one road junction and one
place. Every pair of places are connected through a path
which does not include intermediate places, that is all
places are reachable through a sequence of road segments.
iii) Each place has a popularity and a type, expressed by
the functions pop : VP → (0, 1) and pt : VP → PT ,
respectively
iv) Every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is assigned a weight of travel
time, i.e. tt : E → R, denoting the minimum time needed
to travel from u to v, and vice versa. ♦
Note that the popularity of a place is intended to represent
the prior probability that a random user is located in that place.
Places having popularity 0 are places that are not reachable
and thus are not relevant for our model. We assume that a
mapping exists between the points in the coordinate space
and the graph elements in V ∪E. Accordingly, a true position
(x, y) is mapped onto either an edge or a place.
In this model, a region is a connected subgraph of the city
network, denoted G′ = (V ′, E′) with V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E.
The simplest region consists of a single place. In that case the
graph degenerates in a singleton graph. In case needed, it is
trivial to get an areal representation of the region, by ﬁnding
the minimum bounding rectangle of the geo-spatial extension
of the subgraph. Moreover, as we are in an urban setting, the
elements in the region can be also identiﬁed by their street
address.
Given a region r, we deﬁne the popularity of a place type
pt in r, denoted popr(pt), as the aggregated popularity of
the places of that type located in r. Conventionally, popr(.)
denotes the popularity of the region, i.e.
∑
pti∈PT popr(pti).
2To simplify the terminology, we use the term place for both the elements
in VP and the corresponding locations
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For example the popularity of a region which only encloses
roads (and no places) is 0.
Finally, the real time trajectory of a user over a city
network is a sequence of timestamped regions, i.e. T =
{(r1, t1), (r2, t2), . . . , (rn, tn)} with ti < ti+1. The snapshot
position (ri, ti) means that at time ti the user is located in
the subgraph of region ri where the subgraph can also be a
singleton graph; (rn, tn) is the current position. We refer to
the real time trajectory which is disclosed to the LBS provider
as shared trajectory.
B. Privacy requirements
We adopt the computational model deﬁned in [1]. Let
us introduce the set PTS ⊆ PT of user-deﬁned sensitive
place types. We recall that, in such a model, a set of CRs
blurring the sensitive places are ﬁrst generated, then each
user’s position is possibly replaced by the CR containing that
position. Transposed into our domain, a CR is a region of
the city network, i.e. a subgraph, satisfying a set of privacy
requirements. We consider two kinds of privacy requirements:
the requirements on the single CR, and the requirements over
sequences of CRs.
Replacing the true position with a CR impacts the qual-
ity of the position information. We measure the quality of
the position resulting from the cloaking operation using the
following metric, the average diameter of the CRs subgraphs
{G1, G2, . . . , Gn}, i.e.
QSCR =
1
n
n∑
i
diameter(Gi)
We refer the reader to [6] for additional metrics that
characterize the loss in service quality due to the protection
against the velocity-based attacks. Those metrics can be
straightforwardly transposed to our domain.
Privacy requirements on single CRs. The privacy
proﬁle speciﬁes for each place type pti ∈ PT a user-
deﬁned threshold value τi indicating the maximum allowed
probability of association between a user and a place of such
type. We rule out the case in which τi = 1 because it means
that the place pti is not sensitive. Formally, the pair (pti, τi)
prescribes that in any CR the posterior probability that a
user is in a sensitive place of type pti must not exceed the
user-deﬁned threshold. The privacy requirement is:
popr(pti)
popr(.)
≤ τi (1)
Consider the example reported in Figure 3. The graph shows
two sensitive places (red circles) of type U and H respectively
and two non-sensitive places (black rectangles). All places
have the same popularity (0.1). Assume a privacy proﬁle
consisting of two constraints: (U, 0.5) and (H, 0.5). The CR in
Figure 3(a) satisﬁes the two constraints because the posterior
probability that the user is in U (in H) is 0.5. However, it
is easy to see that if the user stops in a place within the
region (and that can be inferred from the time spent in the
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) Cloaking of two sensitive places of different type. The privacy
requirements speciﬁed in the privacy proﬁle are satisﬁed, but not the minimal
dislcosure; (b) A strongly cloaked region satisﬁes also the minimal disclosure
requirement.
region) such place is certainly sensitive. That leads to a privacy
breach. In general, this privacy breach occurs if the probability
of associating the user with a sensitive place (of any type)
exceeds the highest threshold speciﬁed in the privacy proﬁle.
Formally, this additional privacy requirement can be expressed
as follows:
∑
pti∈PTS
popr(pti)
popr(.)
≤ max
i
{τi} (2)
We refer to this privacy requirement as minimal disclosure.
Now we introduce the notion of strongly cloaked region and
show that it satisﬁes the minimal disclosure requirement and
generalizes the deﬁnition given in [1].
Deﬁnition 2 (Strongly cloaked region): A strongly cloaked
region r, for a given privacy proﬁle, is a region satisfying the
following conditions:
- r contains at least one sensitive place
- The popularity of r satisﬁes the following inequality :
∑
pti∈PTS
popr(pti)
τi
≤ popr(.) (3)
♦
Property 1: A strongly cloaked region has the following
properties:
(1) It satisﬁes the privacy requirements of the privacy proﬁle
(2) It satisﬁes the minimal disclosure requirement
(3) It contains at least one place which is not sensitive. In
particular, by rewriting inequality 3 as:
∑
pti∈PTS
popr(pti)
(1− τi)
τi
≤
∑
ptj∈PTNS
popr(ptj) (4)
we obtain the condition that must be satisﬁed by the set
of non sensitive places (PTNS) in the region.
Proof sketch. From inequality 3:
(1) For every place type, it holds that popr(pti)τi ≤ popr(.);
(2) It holds:
∑
pti∈PTS
popr(pti)
maxi{τi} ≤
∑
pti∈PTS
popr(pti)
τi
≤ popr(.)
(3) By deﬁnition a CR must contain at least one sensitive
place whose popularity cannot be 0. Therefore the left
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member of inequality 4 is greater than 0 and thus also
the popularity of non-sensitive places. ♦
An example of strongly cloaked region is illustrated in
Figure 3(b). The CR contains, in addition to the sensitive
places, also two non-sensitive places (the black rectangles).
Therefore the posterior probability that the user is in some
sensitive place is 0.5 and thus the minimal disclosure
requirement is satisﬁed.
Privacy requirements on sequences of CRs. The
effectiveness of the cloaking method can be compromised
by the velocity-based linkage attack [6], i.e. an adversary
can leverage the information on the maximum velocity to
delimit the user’s position within the CRs reported in the
shared trajectory. We recall that the edges of the city network
are weighted with travel time, expressing the minimum time
(i.e. maximum velocity) to traverse an edge and that such
information is publicly known. To prevent this privacy breach,
we redeﬁne the safety condition that must hold between CRs
for a shared trajectory not to be susceptible to velocity-based
linkage attacks [6].
Accordingly, we deﬁne the node-pairwise distance
dpp(G1, G2) between the two CRs G1=(V1, E1) and
G2=(V2, E2) as the longest shortest path between any
node in G1 and any node in G2, i.e. dpp(G1, G2) =
maxv∈lV1 maxw∈lV2 ShortestPath(v,w). Notice that the
distance along the graph is measured in time units. The safety
requirement is as follows: G1 and G2 are safe to disclose if
the node-pairwise distance between them is lower than the
time t spent by the user to reach G2 from G1 (or vice versa),
i.e.:
dpp(G1, G2) < t (5)
Problem formulation. In summary the problem can be for-
mulated as follows. Assume the adversary knows (i) the city
network, (ii) the user’s privacy proﬁle, (iii) the privacy algo-
rithms and (iv) all the previous and current reported positions.
The problem is to generate strongly cloaked regions and ensure
that those regions are safe at run time, while limiting the loss
of quality of the location sharing service.
C. Architecture
We consider two kinds of architecture: ofﬂine and online .
a) In the ofﬂine architecture, all the cloaked regions are
precomputed, possibly by the client itself, if the device is
properly equipped, or by some other party, and recorded on
the client. Service requests (i.e. location sharing services) are
checked for privacy breach (against the velocity-based linkage
attacks) if the respective cloaked region is disclosed. If no, the
respective cloaked region is disclosed to the LBS provider,
otherwise a transformation is needed. We consider two kinds
of transformations: time delay and postdating.
In the time delay mode, the request is postponed in time
domain. In the postdating mode, instead of disclosing the
actual cloaked region rj , a previous safe position is disclosed.
The time delay mode introduces temporal error while the
postdating mode introduces spatial error, both measured in
time metrics. Unless the time delay is not greater than the
acceptable time delay threshold, we prefer time delay over
space error. Otherwise, we apply postdating.
b) In the online architecture, both the region cloaking and
transformation are done at client side when the services are re-
quested. Hence, this is more computationally demanding than
the ofﬂine cloaking. However, online cloaking is advantageous
for constantly changing city networks (e.g. the popularity of
places during the day) and user privacy requirements.
IV. ALGORITHMS
In this section we propose algorithms that satisfy privacy
preference for each LBS user according to respective privacy
proﬁle. To do so, we ﬁrst generate cloaked regions and
then transform the current location by taking into consid-
eration both the previously reported location sequence and
the velocity-based linkage attack. We have two kinds of
algorithms, ofﬂine cloaking and online cloaking.
A. Ofﬂine Cloaking
Ofﬂine cloaking operates in two stages, (i) ofﬂine static
cloaking of sensitive places, and (ii) online transformation
which ensures no privacy breach against velocity attacks.
We consider two cloaking methods: disjoint and overlapping.
Disjoint cloaking allows no overlap between cloaked regions
but allows more than one sensitive place to be co-located into a
single cloaked region. On the other hand, overlapping cloaking
allows overlaps between cloaked regions and assigns only
one sensitive place per cloaked region. Note that assigning
one sensitive place per cloaked region is possible as all the
places are terminal nodes. During the LBS request, in case a
privacy breach is detected a transformation (either time delay
or postdating) is applied. Figure 4 shows a sample overlapping
and disjoint cloaking.
Since a single place can fall in multiple cloaked regions
with overlapping cloaking (e.g. cr1 and cr2 in Figure 4(a)),
care must be taken while picking the cloaked region to be
reported among alternatives. This is simply because, we have
assumed that the attacker knows our algorithm (hence our
cloaking strategy). One trivial solution is randomly picking
anyone among the alternatives. A potential danger, however,
may be if the user stays too long in the same place and issues
service requests constantly, the attacker can conclude that the
user is indeed at the intersection of randomly reported cloaked
regions. In such case, it sufﬁces to keep sending the initially
randomly selected region all the time.
1) Generating Cloaking Map: The pseudo-code of overlap-
ping and disjoint cloaking algorithms are given in Algorithm
1 and Algorithm 2, respectively. Starting from the sensitive
seed node, the algorithms do a breadth-ﬁrst search (BFS)
to extend the subgraph for the respective cloaked region.
BFS is preferred because it tends to output compact (small
diameter) subgraphs. After the BFS traversal is completed,
we include all the original edges between the vertices in the
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Fig. 4. Overlapping cloaking and Disjoint cloaking.
resulting BFS tree. This is particularly important to preserve
the shortest paths among the vertices of the subgraph. We call
the output of the algorithms as the cloaking map, consisting
of a number of cloaked regions per proﬁle (not per person, as
many individuals may be assigned to the same proﬁle). Note
that both of the algorithms enforce the privacy requirements
for a particular proﬁle. Also note that, the cloaking map is
produced without any reference to the velocity attack, which
is handled during the transformation stage.
Algorithm 1 Overlapping cloaking
Input: Annotated city network G = (V,E, pop, pt, tt), pri-
vacy proﬁle PP = {(pti, τi)}i∈[1,n]
Output: Cloaked region map
1: map ← ∅
2: for all u ∈ V s.t. u.pt ∈ PTS do
3: cr ← ∅
4: totalPop ← u.pop
5: while (true) do
6: v ← next move from BFS(u)
7: if v.pt ∈ PTNS then
8: cr.addEdge(edge(parent(v), v))
9: totalPop ← totalPop+ v.pop
10: if u.poppopcr(·) ≤ τi where u.pt = pti then
11: break
12: map ← map⋃{cr}
Consider Figure 4, where rounded rectangles show the
nonsensitive places while the bigger solid circles show the
sensitive places, one from each of Hospital, Night Club
and Temple place types, also shown is the roads and road
crossings. The ﬁgure illustrates the progress of the overlapping
and disjoint cloaking algorithms. In the overlapping cloaking, a
separate cloaking is started from each of the sensitive place to
result in three cloaked regions, cr1, cr2 and cr3 (Figure 4(a)).
Note that cr1 and cr2 overlap and if the user is located in the
Algorithm 2 Disjoint cloaking
Input: Annotated city network G = (V,E, pop, pt, tt), pri-
vacy proﬁle PP = {(pti, τi)}i∈[1,n]
Output: Cloaked region map
1: map ← ∅
2: for all u ∈ V s.t. u.pt ∈ PTS do
3: cr ← ∅
4: necesNonSenPop ← 0
5: while (true) do
6: v ← next move from BFS(u)
7: if v.pt ∈ PTNS then
8: cr.addEdge(edge(parent(v), v))
9: cv ← cloakingRegionOf(v)
10: necesNonSenPop += v.pop (1−τi)τi where v.pt =
pti
11: if cv 	= ⊥ then
12: cr.merge(cv)
13: for all w ∈ cv.V s.t. w.pt ∈ PTS do
14: necesNonSenPop += w.pop (1−τi)τi where
w.pt = pti
15: if popcr(PTNS) ≥ necesNonSenPop then
16: break
17: map ← map⋃{cr}
intersection, either cr1 or cr2 can be reported as the cloaked
region. In the disjoint cloaking, similarly a separate cloaking
is started from each of sensitive place. However, whenever an
overlap is detected the regions are merged into one to result
in disjoint cloaked regions of cr1 and cr2 (Figure 4(b)).
2) Transformation: When the user requests to use LBS
with his last position, then velocity attack should be voided.
Algorithm 3 gives the pseudo-code for the transformation
needed to guard against the velocity attack. First the algorithm
checks whether it is possible to convey the request under the
velocity attack; if so, the current position is said to be safe
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with respect to the previous position and is conveyed (with or
without cloaking depending on the location of the user w.r.t.
the cloaking map). If the current position opens up a privacy
breach, computed in line 5 according to Equation 5, then two
alternatives (time delay and postdating) are evaluated and time
delay is preferred in case the best time delay is less than a
predeﬁned maximum delay parameter. In case it is impossible,
postdating remains the only possibility and we do a regression
along the path to the previously reported location and report
the ﬁrst position not causing a privacy breach. In the algorithm,
for the sake of simplicity, we treated user positions not inside
cloaked regions as a degenerate cloaked region consisting of
a single point.
In case the postdating introduces too much spatial error, then
it might be preferable to drop the service request rather than
reporting an obsolete location. For a ﬁxed postdating threshold
the success rate (a quality metric) can be measured.
Algorithm 3 Transformation
Input: Annotated city network G = (V,E, pop, pt, tt), cloak-
ing map map, request timestamp tq , location loc of user
U
Output: Cloaked region/point and issuance time
1: Let A to be last issued cr/point with issuance time tA
2: CRsU ← {cr ∈ map : loc ∈ cr}
3: if CRsU = ∅ then
4: CRsU ← loc  a single point cr
5: CRsU ← {cr ∈ CRsU : cr is safe w.r.t. A}
6: if CRsU 	= ∅ then
7: return a random cr ∈ CRsU and tq
8: mindelay ← mincr∈CRsU{delay needed for cr}
9: if mindelay ≤ MAX DELAY then
10:  time delay
11: crmin ← argmincr∈CRsU{delay needed for cr}
12: return crmin and tq +mindelay
13: else
14:  postdate
15: crf ← ﬁrst safe cr (w.r.t. A) along regressing
path(loc, A)
16: return crf and tq
B. Online Cloaking
We consider online cloaking more appropriate for the cases
where the popularity of places are not static and change
signiﬁcantly depending on the time of day, day of week
and so on. Just consider for instance that night clubs are
more frequented in nights and almost vacant in day time.
So, any ofﬂine cloaking is a potential privacy breach for such
situations.
Algorithm 4 presents our online cloaking method. First of
all the algorithm differs from the ofﬂine cloaking method by
combining the cloaking map generation and transformation
stages into a single stage. The function Subgraph(G,A, tq −
tA) returns the subgraph G′ of the annotated city network
G. The subgraph contains A and its reachable vertices/edges
within time tq−tA. The function CloakingRegions(G′, PP )
returns the cloaked regions (local map) for the subgraph G′.
The function can invoke either of Algorithm 1 or 2 with G′.
After we ﬁnd the local map′, the Transformation algorithm
(Algorithm 3) is invoked to give the cloaked region/point and
issuance time to be reported to the LBS. Note that online
cloaking combines the two stages of ofﬂine cloaking on the
local subgraph G′.
Algorithm 4 Online cloaking
Input: Annotated city network G = (V,E, pop, pt, tt), pri-
vacy proﬁle PP = {(pti, τi)}i∈[1,n], request timestamp
tq , location loc of the user U
Output: cr/point and issuance time
1: Let A to be the last issued cr/point with issuance time tA
2: G′ ← Subgraph(G,A, tq − tA)
3: map′ ← CloakingRegions(G′, PP )
4: return Transformation(G′,map′, tq, loc)
1) Performance improvement: Although the online cloak-
ing algorithm is conceptually simple, it may become not prac-
tical due to the online performance requirements. The main
bottleneck is the size of the subgraph for the annotated city
network and number of cloaked regions within it, since both
of them have to be computed online, i.e. following the service
request. To guard against velocity attack, one can be tempted
to pick a cloaked region among a few cloaked regions closest
to the actual user location. However, this approach comes with
a privacy breach regardless of the selection process, whether
deterministic or random. Note that any deterministic strategy is
not private due to the background information of the attacker.
Unfortunately, neither the random selection strategy is privacy
preserving in most non-trivial cases [6].
Our technique uses the last cloaked region reported to LBS,
rather than the actual location/cloaked region. The approach
is as follows. First, a cut (passing through the previous re-
ported location/cloaked region) is selected randomly, hence it
partitions the region into two, the one containing the subgraph
located in clockwise and the another located in counter clock-
wise directions of the cut. After this step we only maintain
the partition containing the actual location and discard the
other. Clearly, this step reduces the size of the subgraph G′ to
almost half. We repeat the process until we get a manageable
number of cloaked regions (denoted with K) left in G′,
which is used for transformation. The partitioning procedure
is integrated in the function CloakingRegions(G′, PP ) (line
3) of Algorithm 4. The procedure ensures that the resulting
map′ contains at most K cloaked regions. The partitioning is
illustrated in Figure 5.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To assess the utility of the proposal we experimented
with the OpenStreetMap’s Milano Street Map Dataset, and
evaluated our ofﬂine and online cloaking algorithms.
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
(a) Previous and the current location


(b) Cloaking around the previous lo-
cation


(c) Partitioning the cloaked region


(d) Second iteration for partitioning
Fig. 5. Cutting the local subgraph of annotated city network for partitioning.
A. Dataset
We picked Milano downtown area (from OpenStreetMap3)
and processed the raw data to obtain the annotated city
network according to our deﬁnition. In detail, the raw dataset
consist of points, lines, polygons, and in some cases an
attached semantics (like place types). To get our annotated
city network, lines (representing roads), points (representing
points of interests like pharmacies), and polygons (represent-
ing buildings of places like large hospitals) served as the
components. Most of the annotations are added by the users
of the application by tagging. We also apply a data cleaning
stage to ﬁx wrongly spotted places, for instance a car park
with no connection to roads. Table I summarizes the resulting
database.
We use the following hypothetical uniform popularity
for places of type: worship ∝ 0.09, healthcare ∝
0.30, education ∝ 0.60, socialactivities ∝ 0.06,
entertainment ∝ 0.15, shopping ∝ 0.02 and others ∝
0.01. The raw dataset contains travel time information for all
the edges. Since our algorithms repeatedly need shortest paths,
we pre-compute all the shortest paths using Floyd-Warshall
algorithm.
Given the annotated city network, we generate 1000 tra-
jectories each having 100 points to simulate the LBS user
requests. Each trajectory on average runs approximately 7
hours.
B. Experiments
In our preliminary evaluation of two methods for the online
cloaking, disjoint method is found to be too slow in compari-
son to the overlapping method. Since the bottleneck with the
online cloaking is efﬁciency, in the sequel we only provide
results for overlapping method for online cloaking.
We are particularly interested in two effectiveness metrics,
(i) average cloaked region size measured as mean diameter,
and (ii) average total penalty which adds temporal error (time
delay) and spatial error (postdate distance) to get a single
measure (recall that both are temporal measures). Runtime is
the sole metric for efﬁciency. Figure 6 shows a sample for our
cloaking maps.
Figure 7 gives the performance results at various disclo-
sure threshold levels. The reported results belong to two
3http://www.openstreetmap.org/
Fig. 6. A sample output from our cloaking methods.
Fig. 8. Time delay versus postdating.
distinct personalized privacy proﬁles, PP1 = {(worship, τ =
x)} and PP2 = {(worship, τ = x), (healthcare, τ =
x), (entertainment, τ = x)} where the value for x is the
respective value at x-axis. From the results it is clear that
the online method runs quite slow in comparison to ofﬂine
methods as expected. This is the price paid to accommodate
the dynamic nature of popularity. Overlapping method for
ofﬂine cloaking performs favorably to disjoint method, both
in effectiveness and efﬁciency. As shown in Figure 8 there is
a tradeoff between time delay and postdating.
Figures 9(e) and 9(f) present the effect of K value on the
runtime and request drop counts for online cloaking. With
partitioning heuristic, service drops are not due to the lack of
solutions rather than to obsolete location reporting. No solution
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TABLE I
MILANO OPENSTREETMAP DATASET
Feature Value
region Milano downtown with spatial extension of 3km by 3km
vertex set 8263 places of interest plus road intersections
# of edges 34000 (bidirectional)
# of places 3800
place types (counts) education (22), healthcare (includes hospitals and pharmacy) (27), worship (64),
social activities (20), entertainment (29), shopping (40)
(a) (b) (c)
PP1 = {(worship, τ = x)}
(d) (e) (f)
PP2 = {(worship, τ = x), (healthcare, τ = x), (entertainment, τ = x)}
Fig. 7. Performance results at various disclosure thresholds.
case is possible since some cloaked regions possibly in the
original solution are ruled out during partitioning. The request
drop counts are average counts per trajectory (e.g. over 1000∗
100 service requests). The results from Figure 9(e) clearly
shows that the runtime decreases with decreasing K values,
and hence the utility of the partitioning heuristic. On the other
hand, we see from Figure 9(f) that when K is smaller the
number of service request drop rates increase as it becomes
hard to meet the time delay and postdate requirements with
small number of cloaked regions.
Scalability is an important issue when the number of private
places are too high. Note that this is quite realistic as we are
working in urban settings. For scalability tests, we generated
10 random private place type each with 50 places, and added
each of them to the next privacy proﬁle one by one. So,
there are 50, 100 and 500 private places in the ﬁrst, second
and tenth tests, respectively. The effectiveness and efﬁciency
performances are provided in Figure 9. In the results, we
measure the performance metrics w.r.t. the number of sensitive
places (x-axis). In all of the tests, the disclosure threshold is
set to 0.1 for all the place types. Online cloaking again runs
too slow and its performance degrades with increasing number
of sensitive places. In all the tests, ofﬂine-overlapping method
exhibits a nice scalability proﬁle.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an approach to the privacy-
preserving sharing of sensitive positions in urban settings.
The reference space is represented by an annotated graph
while different techniques for the computation of cloaked
regions on this graph have been evaluated. The notion of
strongly cloaked region generalizes previous results while
novel cloaking methods for the creation of overlapping sub-
graphs proved to be effective in terms of performance and
quality of position information. This method can run on client
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(a) Average diameter (b) Average total penalty (c) Runtime
(d) Runtime (e) Runtime (f) Service request drop counts
Fig. 9. Scalability (a),(b),(c),(d) and effect of partitioning on online cloaking (e),(f).
devices, e.g. smartphone, provided that the client can store and
efﬁciently access the annotated city network. Moreover it does
not require dedicated costly infrastructure (i.e. anonymizer),
and that paves the way to the cost-effective deployment of this
solution. Although this work has been developed in the context
of LBSs, we imagine that the approach could be extended to
the protection of trajectory data in data publishing. In this case,
the challenge is to integrate methods for the anonymization of
trajectories with solutions for the safe cloaking of sensitive
places.
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